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From 1992 to 1993, the author served as one of three
Commissioners of the United Nations Commission on the
Truthfor El Salvador. In this Article, the authordescribes the
process the Commissionfollowed in Its investigationof acts of
violence that occurred in El Salvador between 1980 and
1991. The Article explores how the Commissioners interpreted and applied their mandate, as well as the problems
they encountered In gathering informationfor the Commission's report. The author relates how the Commission arrived
at the important decision to include in its report the names of
individualsfound to have been responsiblefor violent acts.
The authorconcludes by presenting lessons learnedfrom the
experiences of the Commission that may be valuable tofuture
commissions charged with investigating human rights
violations.

* Lobingier Professor of Comparative and International Law, The National Law

Center, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.; former President,
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This Article is an extensively expanded
and updated version of a speech delivered by Professor Buergenthal as the
Charles N. Burch Lecture at the Vanderbilt University School of Law in March
1993.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 15, 1993, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, made public the Report of the
Commission on the Truth for El Salvador: From Madness to Hope
(Report).' The Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (Truth
Commission or Commission) was formally established on July 15,
1992, pursuant to the provisions of the Salvadoran Peace Accords
(Peace Accords),2 a series of agreements negotiated between 1989

1.

Report of the Commission on the Truthfor El Salvador: From Madness to

Hope, U.N. Doc. S/25500, Annexes (1993) (English version) [hereinafter Report].
Although the Report was made public on March 15, 1993, the official text was not
released until April 1, 1993. Throughout this Article, Report, in italics has been
used to refer to the document published by the United Nations. References to the
work-in-progress appear capitalized as Report, without italics. General references
to a report remain in lower case.
2.

El Salvador Agreements: The Path to Peace, (Department of Public

Information) U.N. Doc. DPI/1208-92614 (1992). The Salvadoran Peace Accords
consist of a series of agreements, negotiated over a period of more than three
years (1989-1992), between the Government of El Salvador and the Frente
Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN). a coalition of five
Salvadoran rebel groups.
Two of these agreements, published in the
aforementioned volume and cited in this article, are: 1) the Mexico Agreements,
April 27, 1991, at 13-31; and 2) the Peace Agreement, Jan. 16, 1992, at 46-145
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and 1992 under the auspices of the United Nations. The parties
to these negotiations were the government of El Salvador and the
Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN). The
negotiations were enthusiastically promoted by Javier Perez de
Cuellar, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, and
Imaginatively spurred on by his personal representative and
mediator, Alvaro de Soto. The governments of Colombia, Mexico,
Spain and Venezuela-the four, so-called "friends of the peace
process"--played a special role in assisting with the negotiations
and in helping overcome deadlocks. 3 The negotiations were
formally concluded with the signing on January 16, 1992, in
Mexico City of a comprehensive peace agreement, 4 named the
"Chapultepec Agreement" for the castle where the signing
ceremony took place. This instrument incorporated by reference
a series of earlier accords concluded by the Parties.
The
establishment of the Truth Commission is provided for in the socalled "Mexico Agreements," which were signed on April 27,

1991.5

These agreements, amplified by one provision of the

Chapultepec Agreement, 6 spell out the functions and powers or
mandate of the Truth Commission.
Pursuant to its mandate, the Commission was to consist of
"three individuals appointed by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations after consultation with the Parties." 7 After informing the Parties of the names of the individuals he intended to
name to the Commission and encountering no objections from
them, the Secretary-General designated the following individuals:
Belisario Betancur, former President of Colombia, Reinaldo

[hereinafter, respectively, the Mexico Agreements and the ChapultepecAgreement].
For a review of the contents of these agreements, see Report of the Independent
Expert on El Salvador, Mr. Pedro Nlkken, on Developments in the Human Rights
Situations in El Salvador,Prepared Pursuantto the Commission on Human Rights
Resolution 1993/93 and Economic and Social Council Decision 1993/284, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1993/11, at 11-13 (Feb. 3, 1994) [hereinafter Report of the
Independent Expert].
3.
See generally Terry L. Karl, El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution, 71

FOREIGN AFF. 147 (1992). For a report on the evolution of the human rights
provisions found in the Salvadoran Peace Accords by a member of the United
Nations negotiating team responsible for this subject, see Pedro Nikken, El
Salvador: Los Derechos Humanos en la Antesala de la Guerra y de la Paz, 84/86
BOLETIM DA SOCIEDADE BRASILEIRA DE DmErrO INTERNACIONAL 69 (Dec. 1992/May
1993). For an assessment of the role of the UN Secretary-General, see Thomas M.
Franck & Georg Nolte, The Good Offices of the UN Secretary General, in UNITED
NATIONS, DIVDED WORLDS: Tim UN's ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 143, 152-

155 (Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury, eds., 2d ed. 1993).
4.
ChapultepecAgreement, supra note 2, at 46, 123.
5. Mexico Agreements, supra note 2, at 13, 18.
6.
ChapultepecAgreement, supra note 2, ch. 1, para. 5, at 53.
7. Mexico Agreements, supra note 2, at 29.
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Figueredo, former Foreign Minister of Venezuela, and myself, a
former President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
The Commissioners, in turn, chose President Betancur to serve as
the chairman of the Commission. The overall task of the
Commission was to investigate the "serious acts of violence" that
occurred in El Salvador between 1980 and 1991 "and whose
impact on society urgently requires that the public should know
the truth."8 In discharging its responsibilities, the Commission
was to take account of two principal considerations: first, "the
exceptional importance" attaching "to the acts to be investigated,
their characteristics and impact, and the social unrest to which
they gave rise;" and second, "the need to create confidence in the
positive changes" to be effected by the peace process and "to
assist the transition to national reconciliation." 9 In other words,
not all serious acts of violence were necessarily to be investigated.
The main focus was to be on acts that had a special or broader
impact on society in general. Moreover, in ascertaining the truth,
the Commission was not to lose sight of the fact that the
promotion of national reconciliation was an overarching aim of
the investigation.

In addition to these general powers, the Commission was
assigned a specific task under Article 5 of the Chapultepec
Agreement, which reads in part as follows:
The Parties recognize the need to clarify and put an end to any
indication of impunity on the part of officers of the armed forces,
particularly in cases where respect for human rights Is jeopardized.
To that end, the Parties refer this Issue
to the Commission on the
10
Truth for consideration and resolution.

This provision, which required the Commission to address
violations of human rights committed by El Salvador's armed
forces, has tended to be overlooked by those in that country who
have charged the Commission with an anti-military bias. In interpreting this clause, the Commissioners proceeded on the
assumption that it was not possible to put an end to "impunity on
the part of officers of the armed forces" without identifying the
serious acts of violence some of them committed, describing the
resulting cover-ups by them and their superiors, and assigning
responsibility for these acts.'1
To understand the role and powers of the Truth Commission,
it is important to note at the outset that in addition to
investigating the serious acts of violence, the Commission was

8.
9.

Id.
Id. at 30.

10. ChapultepecAgreement, supra note 2, ch. 1, para. 5, at 53.

11. See Report, supra note 1, at 18.
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also charged with the task of "recommending the legal, political or
administrative measures which can be inferred from the results of
the investigation," including measures designed "to prevent the
repetition of such acts." 12 Moreover, the Parties undertook "to

carry out the Commission's recommendations." 13 In other words,
by signing the Peace Accords, the FMLN and the government of El
Salvador agreed to accept the recommendations as binding on
them.
The Commission was given a period of six months within
which to submit its report to the Parties and to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations. 1 4 It took the Commission eight
months to complete its task. Obviously, this was not sufficient
time to do justice to all the terrible injustices committed by both
sides to the conflict in El Salvador, but that was not the objective
of the Parties. They wanted an investigation that focused on
some of the most egregious acts and a set of recommendations to
help ensure that the past would not repeat itself.
The establishment of the Truth Commission marks the first
time that the parties to an internal armed conflict, in negotiating
a peace agreement, conferred on a commission composed of
foreign nationals designated by the United Nations the power to
investigate human rights violations committed during the conflict
and to make binding recommendations. Similar institutions will
probably be created in the future by the United Nations or some
regional international organization. 1 5 National reconciliation is
often difficult to achieve in countries trying to overcome the
consequences of a bloody, internal armed conflict or an especially
repressive regime without an appropriate accounting for or
acknowledgment of past human rights violations. To the extent
that the Truth Commission as an institution met the demands of

the Salvadoran peace process, it has become a model the

12.

Mexico Agreements, supra note 2, at 30.

13. Id. at 31.
14. Id.
15.

There existed some earlier national truth commissions, the most famous

of these being those that were established by Argentina and Chile following their
transitions to democracy. For articles dealing with these bodies, see Jorge Correa
S., Dealing with PastHuman Rights Violations: The Chilean Case After Dictatorshp,
67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1455 (1992); Emilio F. Mignone et al., Dictatorshipon Triar
Prosecutionof Human Rights Violations in Argentina, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 118 (1984).
Generally on this subject, see Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth
Commssions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, HuM. RTs. Q. (forthcoming
November 1994).
See also LEO VALLADARES LANZI, THE FAcTs SPEAK FOR
THEMSELVES:
THE PRELIMINARY REPORT ON DISAPPEARANcES OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSIONER FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONDURAS (Human Rights

Watch/Americas (formerly Americas Watch) trans., 1994) (abridged English
translation of Los ECHOS HABLAN PRO SI MISMOS: INFORME PRELIMINAR SOBRE LOS
DESPARE IDOS EN HONDURAS 1980-1993 (1994)).
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international community is likely to draw upon in the years to
come. Thus, although the conditions, problems, and needs of El
Salvador are not likely to be duplicated in other countries where
truth commissions of one type or another might be called for,

much can nevertheless be learned from the experience of the
Salvadoran Truth Commission. Therefore, this Article describes
the manner in which the Commission sought to implement its
mandate, reached its findings, and encountered problems in
performing its functions. This Article concludes with some
reflections on the Commission's experience and a very tentative
16
assessment of its contribution.

II. THE CONTEXT
The twelve-year Salvadoran civil war cost some 75,000 lives,
an extremely high number considering that the country only has
a population of about five million people. It was played out in the
context of the Cold War, with the United States supporting the
Salvadoran government.
U.S. military and economic aid
amounted to more than six billion dollars. The FMLN, an alliance
of five leftist insurgent groups, received substantial assistance,
especially weapons and military training, from Cuba, Sandinista
Nicaragua, the Soviet Union, and other Soviet bloc countries.
By the time the Cold War had begun to wind down, it became
clear that the government side would not be able to defeat the
FMLN militarily, nor the FMLN the government, and that their
respective patrons-the United States on the one hand, and the
Communist bloc on the other-no longer had the requisite
political interest or the economic resources to support their
Salvadoran clients. At this point the notion of a negotiated peace

gradually began to appeal to both sides.

This change in the

16. For articles discussing the Truth Commission, see Cynthia Arnson, El
Salvador Accountability and Human Rights: The Report of the United Nations
Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, AMERICAS WATCH-NEws FROM THE
AMERICAS, August 10, 1993, at 1; Douglass Cassel, Jr., International Truth
Commissions and Justice, 5 ASPEN INST. Q. 69 (1993); Margaret E. Crahan, Truth
Telling and Accountability: The Case of El Salvador In Comparative Perspective, 4
INT'L PAPERS IN PASTORAL MINISTRY, May/June 1993, at 1; Symposium, El Inforne
de la Comlslon de la Verdad. AnalLsis, Reflexiones y Comentarlos, 48 ESTUDIOS
CENTROAMERicANOs 333 (1993). For a conference report on the Truth Commission,
see GARY BLAND, EL SALVADOR.

SUSTAINING

PEACE,

NOuRISHING

DEMOcRACY

(Woodrow Wilson Center/Washington Office on Latin America, Washington, D.C.
1993). This report contains comments by, inter alla, Pedro Nkken, Carlos
Chipoco, Margarete Crahan, Iqbal Riza, and three Salvadoran political leaders.
See also Hayner. supra note 15 (analyzing the role of the Truth Commission in El
Salvador and the various national bodies that performed similar functions).
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political climate provided the impetus for a UN-brokered, multistage process of negotiations that eventually produced the
17
peaceful resolution of the Salvadoran armed conflict.
The war was particularly brutal in its impact on the civilian
population. Not surprisingly, both sides to the struggle accused
each other of bearing responsibility for the numerous atrocities
that had been committed over the twelve-year period. Some of
the crimes attracted worldwide attention, particularly the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero, the killings of six
Jesuit priests, the rape and murder of four American churchwomen, the assassinations of mayors in the so-called conflictive
areas of the country, the Zona Rosa raid in which, among others,
four off-duty U.S. Embassy guards were killed, the El Mozote
massacre, the abductions and assassinations of important
national figures, and the disappearance and torture-deaths of
large numbers of civilian sympathizers of one or the other of the
combatants.1 8
As the peace negotiations advanced, the charges and
counter-charges relating to these and other atrocities threatened
to become serious obstacles to any peaceful resolution of the
conflict. It was soon recognized, therefore, that the hate and mistrust built up over the years required the inclusion in the peace
agreements of various "confidence-building" arrangements, among
them some mechanism permitting an honest accounting of these
terrible deeds. The FMLN had no confidence in the Salvadoran
judicial system, which had not been particularly eager or effective
in solving any crimes attributed to the government side. In fact,
one of the FMLN's main negotiating objectives was a thorough
reform of the justice system.
It considered such action a
necessary guarantee to protect the FMLN leadership and its

supporters against potential government abuses once the FMLN
laid down its weapons. The Parties therefore concluded that a
special body would have to be established to carry out the
investigations.
Gradually they recognized, however, that they
would not be able to agree on any group of Salvadorans that they
would trust to discharge that responsibffity. A formula calling for
a panel of distinguished foreigners to undertake the investigation

17. See generally. Karl, supra note 3 (discussing the negotiation process).
18. There is a vast body of literature on these and related cases. See, e.g.,
MARK DANNER, THE MASSACRE AT EL MOZOTE (1993); MARTHA DOGGETT, DEATH
FORETOLD: THE JESUIT MURDERS IN EL SALVADOR (1993); AMERICAS WATCH, EL
SALVADOR'S TERROR: HUMAN RIGHTS SINCE THE ASSASSINATION OF ARCHBISHOP OF

ROMERO (1991); LAWYERS COMMITEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, EL SALVADOR:
RIGHTS DISMISSED (A REPORT ON 16 UNRESOLVED CASES) (1990).

HUMAN
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proved less objectionable and was eventually accepted by the

Parties. 9 This, in short, is the origin the Truth Commission.
During the negotiations, both sides to the conflict drew up
lists of specific atrocities or cases they wished to have
investigated. 20 Usually a list presented by one of the Parties
would be matched or "trumped" by the other until it became clear
that this process would not produce ready agreement.
The
obvious solution was to avoid identifying the specific cases or
events the Commission was to investigate. This explains why its
mandate speaks merely of "serious acts of violence . . . whose
impact on society urgently require that the public should know
the truth,"2 1 thus leaving it to the Commission to draw up its own
list.

Ill. THE PROCESS OF GATHERING INFORMATION
Before embarking on their mission, the Commissioners had
to recruit a staff. In doing so, they decided that since the Parties
to the Peace Accords had attached great importance to the international character of the Commission, its staff should also be
international in composition. Consequently, no Salvadorans were
hired to work for the Commission. Instead, its staff consisted
largely of lawyers, sociologists, forensic anthropologists, and
social workers drawn from other Latin American countries, the
United States, and Europe. The total number ranged between
twenty to thirty persons, including support personnel. Monies to
finance the Commission's work-some two and a half million
dollars-were contributed to a special UN fund by the United

States, the European Community, the Netherlands, and the
Scandinavian countries; the United States was the largest
contributor with one million dollars. The Commissioners also
decided that the staff should be located in El Salvador, where it in
fact remained for approximately six months. The professional
commitments of the Commissioners made their relocation to El
Salvador impractical. They opted to travel there at least twice a
month, usually remaining in the country for a week or more at
any given time. This practice continued through January 1993,
when the Commission as a whole transferred its operations from

19. Such a national commission was, in fact, established for the purpose of
purging the Salvadoran armed forces of individuals guilty of corruption or serious
violations of human rights. This body, denominated the Ad Hoc Commission,
performed its functions with great courage, honesty, and integrity. See Infra note

33 and accompanying text.
20. See Arnson, supra note 16, at 7-8.
21. Mexico Agreements, supra note 2, at 29.
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El Salvador to the United Nations in New York to finalize its
report.
At their initial meetings, the Commissioners studied the
Commission's mandate and concluded that we should not draw
up a list of cases or events to be investigated before we had an
opportunity to gather more information. The notoriety of a
number of cases-the assassinations of Archbishop Romero and of the Jesuit priests as well as the El Mozote massacre-left no
doubt, of course, that they would have to be dealt with in the
Commission's report. But there were many other very serious
acts of violence that had not received comparable worldwide
attention, and not all of them could possibly be fully investigated
within the six-month deadline fixed by the Parties. Deciding upon
which cases to focus was, therefore, very important and could not

be made without a careful analysis of the relevant events, the
allegations of the Parties, and the information provided to the
Commission by victims, their next of kin, and other sources. The
failure of the Peace Accords to list specific cases, and the
Commissioners' belief that we needed to obtain a more thorough
understanding of the extent and scope of the acts of violence that
had occurred in El Salvador, prompted us to begin with a general
fact-finding assessment before making any decisions regarding
the types of cases or events to be covered in the Report. Of
course, we also had to take account of the specific acts of violence
that each side to the Salvadoran conflict accused the other of
having committed and wanted to have investigated. Although the
Commission was not strictly bound by this wish list, which did
not appear in its mandate, it was not an irrelevant consideration
in the deliberations on this subject.
The Commission's staff was initially instructed to undertake
a broad investigation of the relevant events that transpired during
the twelve-year civil war. Its members interviewed victims and
witnesses and received vast amounts of testimony and evidence
non-governmental
and
governmental
individuals,
from
They examined court records and sought out
organizations.
The Commission bought
personnel files of military officers.
advertising space in newspapers, and time on radio and
television, informing the public that we had an "open door" policy
and urging the people to come forward with information, to tell
In addition to its
their stories, and to file complaints.
headquarters in San Salvador, the Commission established
additional offices in different parts of the country to make it easier
for the population to contact us.
Beginning with the Commissioners' first visit to El Salvador,
we scheduled a series of individual meetings with representatives
of different sectors of Salvadoran society. Over time, we met on
various occasions with officials of the government, the President,
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members of the Cabinet, the President of the Supreme Court, the
Minister of Defense, and the Military High Command. We spoke
with the country's church hierarchy, with the leadership of the
FMLN, with media representatives, with labor and rural
community leaders, and with political party officials. We also
made various trips outside of San Salvador to meet with people in
the countryside and to inspect the sites of alleged atrocities. In
short, we wanted to hear what people had to say, what their
hopes and aspirations were, and what they expected from the
Commission. There was no better way to feel the pulse of the
country.
From these preliminary investigations and explorations there
soon emerged an overview of events between 1980 and 1991 that
enabled the Commissioners to make tentative decisions about the
specific cases or situations that would have to be dealt with in the
Report. While the list was longer at the beginning of the process,
it shrunk as time went on because of insufficient credible
evidence or because we lacked adequate investigative resources to
pursue certain leads. The short, six-month deadline established
in the mandate also affected the number of cases with which the
Commission could deal. Some of the "big" or better-known cases
received the Commission's attention relatively early on in the
process. The more we learned about El Salvador's civil war,
moreover, the clearer it became that some cases were
paradigmatic of a practice of violence that terrorized the country.
That in itself was an important reason why these cases needed to

be addressed.
A. Investigations In El Salvador

The next stage began with a thorough investigation of the
cases. While the staff sifted through evidence and sought to
identify individuals who might have information relating to a
given matter, the Commissioners began to study the 'case files
and to interview alleged perpetrators and individuals thought to
have some relevant information. Here it is appropriate to recall
that the Commission's mandate stipulated that "[t]he Parties
undertake to extend to the Commission whatever cooperation it
requests of them in order to gain access to sources of information
available to them."2 2 On the whole, the Commission encountered
few difficulties in interviewing any individual it wished to have
appear before it. Most civilians, former FMLN combatants, and
military personnel presented themselves at the Commission after
being summoned by it. There were exceptions and delays in

22.

1& at 31.
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appearances, but they were not significant and did not affect the
Commission's work to any significant extent. Of course, it is one
thing for individuals to appear for questioning; it is quite another

for them to tell the truth or, for that matter, to provide
information. More on that subject later.
The Commission encountered greater difficulty in obtaining
relevant documents. Various requests by the Commission for
service records or personnel files of military officers-information
regarding their commands and the locations where they were
stationed at different times during the war-tended more often
than not to be answered with explanations that the files had been
destroyed, could not be found, or were incomplete. Access to files
of the security services could not be obtained. The FMLN was
also not very forthcoming with information concerning the names
and specific deployment of field commanders and related
information that might have helped the Commission to identify an
individual responsible for giving a particular military order. Here
the task was made even more difficult because successive FMLN
field commanders in a given sector apparently frequently used the
nom de guerre of their predecessors.
Thus, testimony by
witnesses that "Commandante Gonzales gave the order," for
example, did not necessarily help identify the specific person who
served as Commandante Gonzales at the relevant time, and that
information could not always be obtained.
B. Relations with the United States
The Commission received
information from various
Salvadoran and international non-governmental organizations as
well as a number of foreign governments. The U.S. government,

after congressional prodding, 23 established an inter-agency
working group to assist the Commission with information. It was
composed of representatives of various U.S. governmental
entities, including the Departments of State, Defense, and
Justice, as well as some intelligence agencies. Coordination of

23. It is quite clear that but for the efforts of a number of Members of
Congress and Senators, led by Representative Joseph Moakley (D-Mass.), the
Truth Commission would have received very little cooperation from the Bush

Administration.

Representative Moakley, who had chaired a very effective

Congressional investigation of the Jesuit murders and was shocked to find the
Salvadoran Military High Command directly implicated, and Jim McGovern, his

astute and energetic aide, helped us overcome numerous obstacles and mobilize
Congressional support to enable the Truth Commission to discharge its mandate.

For Representative Moakley's important contribution to the struggle to improve
the human rights situation in El Salvador, see CyNmiA J. ARNSON, CRossRoADs:
CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND CENTRAL AMERiCA, 1976-1993, at 253 (2d ed.
1993).
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this group was entrusted to the Bureau for Inter-American Affairs
in the Department of State. My colleagues designated me as the
Commission's liaison with the U.S. government. It was my task

to submit requests for Information to the U.S. government 24 and
to negotiate the declassification of documents or to obtain access
to classified materials. Halfway into the exercise, I was even given
a limited security clearance that enabled me to examine some,
but by no means all, relevant State Department files and a very
small number of documents from other agencies. Access to these
files proved particularly useful in verifying information received by
the Commission from other sources. Although I tried to obtain
the same type' of clearance for my. special assistant, a young U.S.
lawyer with impeccable credentials, my requests were repeatedly
denied. It is hard for me to believe that the denial was motivated
by any reason other than a desire to limit the Commission's
access to certain relevant documents. Alone, I could not possibly
read all of these documents and discharge my other
responsibilities as Commissioner.
Some important information in U.S. government hands was
never provided to the Commission. For example, a cursory review
of documents subsequently declassified and released by the
Clinton Administration 2 5 indicates that the inter-agency group
withheld information that could have greatly facilitated the
Commission's truth-finding task without endangering U.S.
national security or intelligence sources. These newly released
documents suggest, moreover, that some of the information
denied the Commission on national security grounds related to
Salvadorans whom some U.S. officials may have wished to protect
from investigation by the Commission.
The Commission's interaction with the inter-agency group
evolved over time. Initially I submitted a list of cases and events

to the group with a request to be provided with whatever relevant
information the United States might have. This approach did not
prove to be very productive because the United States either had
too much or too little information, and much of it was dispersed
among different agencies. A great deal of time and effort was thus
wasted compiling and reviewing information which the
Commission either already had or could have obtained more
readily from other sources.
Therefore, we abandoned this
approach in favor of submitting specific questions concerning
particular cases or events of interest to the Commission. While

24.

In discharging this task. I had the very able assistance of a young

lawyer, Theodore Piccone, who was for that purpose given a leave of absence from
the law firm of Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

25. Clifford Krauss, U.S., Aware of Killings, Worked with Salvador's Rightists,
PapersSuggest. N.Y. TIES, Nov. 9, 1993, at A4.
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this method was much more productive, many of our questions

were answered only partially or not at all, and this was not always

because the U.S. government lacked the information being

sought.
Since my colleagues and I believed that some U.S. officials
who had been stationed in El Salvador could provide us with

useful information, I attempted to obtain permission from various
U.S. agencies to interview these officials. Not surprisingly, some
agencies were more forthcoming than others.
The State
Department was most cooperative, whereas at least two other
departments put every possible obstacle in my way.
One
government agency waited until January 19, 1993-one day
before the inauguration of the Clinton Administration-to deny
my request, which had been pending for months. The incoming
Administration eventually reversed the decision. However, a great
deal of valuable time had been lost. Another agency, for example,
carried the delaying technique to the extreme by stringing out the
negotiations with me until one week before the due date of the
Commission's Report. By that time it was no longer possible to
verify or, for that matter, to make use of the information that was
provided. I am convinced that what was at play here was not a
U.S. government policy to impede the work of the Commission,
but rather decisions of individual officials who disagreed with the
role that the Commission was assigned to play and the formal
decision of the United States to support it.
But even when I received high-level permission to interview
U.S. officials, other obstacles were sometimes put in my way. In
one case I was sent a draft secrecy agreement to be signed by me
prior to the interview. After reading the draft, I concluded that if I
signed it, I would not be able to use the information for any
purpose whatsoever. I responded with a note suggesting that my
analysis of the agreement led me to the sad conclusion that all I
could possibly do with the information I might elicit was to

immediately swallow it, which was hardly the reason why I sought
the interviews. Eventually, we redrafted the agreement and some
interviews were granted. In the process, more valuable time was
lost playing silly games designed to prevent me from gaining
access to U.S. officials who were often quite willing to talk to the
Commission.
Of course, there were other officials who did
everything in their power to avoid being interviewed even after
they were authorized to do so.
The private National Security Archive, located in Washington,
D.C., also proved to be a very valuable resource.
Besides
providing us with many documents, access to its files enabled us
to learn what other information the U.S. government might have,
and to verify the answers provided to us by the inter-agency
group. In a number of cases, documents denied me by the inter-
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agency group on the ground that they were classified, turned out
to have been previously declassified and released to the National
Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act. This

meant that we often had to cross-check the information provided
by the U.S. government against the holdings in the National

Security Archive.
C. The Problem of Confidential Information
In El Salvador, the Commission began the process of interviewing witnesses who might have some information bearing on
any case that had tentatively been placed on the list. There were
basically three types of witnesses: victims or their next of kin,
suspected perpetrators, and individuals who might have some
useful information. As a rule, the Commissioners themselves
interviewed the more important witnesses, particularly higherranking government officials, FMLN commanders, military
officers, and business leaders.
The vast majority of these
individuals, whether or not they were suspected of having committed offenses within the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction,
appeared without legal counsel despite the fact that they were free
to have counsel present. All witnesses were advised that their
testimony would be treated as confidential if they so desired, and
most requested it. It should be noted, in this connection, that the
Commission's mandate stipulated that "[i]ts activities shall be
conducted on a confidential basis"25 and that:
For the purpose of the investigation, the Commission shall
have the power to:
a. Gather, by the means it deems appropriate, any information
it considers relevant. The Commission shall be completely free to
use whatever sources of information it deems useful and reliable.
It shall receive such information within the period of time and in
the manner which it determines.

b. Interview, freely and in private, any
individuals, groups or
27
members of organizations or institutions.

The mandate also stipulated that "[tihe Commission shall not
function in the manner of a judicial body."28 An analysis of these
provisions and of the reality confronting the Commission in El
Salvador convinced the Commissioners that we would have to rely
on confidential information despite the due process implications
inherent in this approach. In reaching this conclusion, we took
two considerations into account.
First, the Commission's
mandate authorized this procedure, and it did so precisely

26.
27.
28.

Mexico Agreements, supranote 2, at 30.
Id.
Id.
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because the Parties to the Peace Accords knew full well that any
other approach would be doomed to failure. That Is, the Parties
proceeded on the assumption that few Salvadorans, if any, would
come forward and testify in public for fear of reprisals from those
they might accuse. Second, it did not take very long for the
Commissioners to recognize that these fears were well-founded
and that the Commission had no other way to protect those who
provided information other than to keep their identities secret. In
its Report, the Commission addressed this problem in the
following terms:
The situation in El Salvador is such that the population at

large continues to believe that many military and police officers in
active service or in retirement, Government officials, judges,

members of [the] FMLN and people who at one time or another
were connected with the death squads are in a position to cause

serious physical and material injury to any person or institution
that shows a readiness to testify about acts of violence committed
between 1980 and. 1991.
The Commission believes that this
suspicion Is not unreasonable, given El Salvador's recent history
and the power still wielded or, in many cases, wielded until

recently by people whose direct involvement in serious acts of
violence or in covering up such acts is well known but who have
not been required to account for their actions or omissions....
The Commission can itself testify 'to the extreme fear of

reprisals frequently expressed, both verbally and through their
behavior, by many of the witnesses it interviewed. It is also
important to emphasize that the Commission was not in a position
to offer any significant protection to witnesses apart from this

guarantee of confidentiality.
Unlike the national courts, for
instance, the Commission did not have the authority to order precautionary measures; neither, of course, did it have police powers.
Besides, it is the perception of the public at large that the
Salvadorian 29Judicial system is unable to offer the necessary
guarantees.

Hence, in examining those who were suspected of having
committed acts falling within the Commission's jurisdiction, the
Commissioners or staff members would Inform them why they
had been summoned to appear, offer them the opportunity to
make whatever statements they deemed appropriate, and ask
them specific questions. These individuals were not, however,
confronted with or given the names of their accusers, nor could
they cross-examine any witnesses against them.
Because
evidence received under such circumstances tends to be suspect
and needs to be handled with great care, the Commission adopted
the following safeguards:
In order to guarantee the reliability of the evidence it gathered,
the Commission insisted on verifying, substantiating and reviewing

29. Report, supranote 1, at 23-24.
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all statements as to facts, checking them against a large number of
sources whose veracity had already been established. It was
decided that no single source or witness would be considered
sufficiently reliable to establish the truth on any issue of fact
needed for the Commission to arrive at a finding. It was also
decided that secondary sources, for instance, reports from national
or international governmental or private bodies and assertions by
people without first-hand knowledge of the facts they reported, did
not on their own constitute a sufficient basis for arriving at
findings. However, these secondary sources were used, along with
circumstantial
evidence, to verify findings based on primary
s
sources.3
In addition, the Commission established three categories of
proof--overwhelming evidence, substantial evidence and sufficient
evidence-for the purpose of assessing the evidence and making
its finding accordingly.3 1 Serious charges against individuals
were to be substantiated by overwhelming or substantial
evidence. The Commission also adopted a policy of not charging

anyone with serious acts of violence without giving the person an
opportunity to be heard and to rebut the charges.
All in all, in gatheiing and evaluating the evidence, the
Commission had to balance the safety of potential witnesses
against the due process interests of those persons accused. At
the same time, the Commission had to recognize that unless It
protected the confidentiality of its sources, it would be unable to
discharge its mandate. It Is important to recall that the very
governmental institutions and the individuals responsible for
many of the most egregious acts of violence in El Salvador
remained in place and in power, which explains the fear of the
vast majority of individuals who appeared before the Commission.
The situation would have been quite different had a transition
government assumed power after the signing of the Peace
Accords, or if a change had occurred in the leadership of the
military and security forces as well as in the judiciary. But none
of that happened In El Salvador while the Commission was
exercising its functions.
That explains, of course, why the
Commission was appointed in the first place, and why it had to
proceed as it did in order to discharge its responsibilities.

30. Id. at 24.
31. Id.
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IV. GETING TO THE TRUTH
A. The Obstacles

During the first two to three months of its stay in El
Salvador, the Commission was able to gather very little useful
information. Relatively few victims or their next of kin came
forward to tell their stories, which was not all that surprising.
The country had just come out of a brutal civil war and, as
pointed out before, fear and suspicion were pervasive. That
segment of the population which had been victimized by
government forces had reason to fear reprisals. Similarly, the
victims of FMLN violence, particularly those living in areas still
controlled by the FMLN or its sympathizers, could expect no
better from that side.
It should also not be forgotten that the average Salvadoran
had no reason to assume that the Commission would in fact carry
out an honest and serious investigation. There had been many
so-called "investigations" in the past, principally domestic ones,
and they produced little information and even less truth. More
often than not, they were publicity stunts staged by the
Salvadoran government, frequently as a result of U.S. pressure
and timed so as to anticipate some action by the U.S. Congress.
Given this experience, Salvadorans certainly had no reason to
trust yet another commission, or three foreigners about whom
they knew little. Moreover, merely being seen talking with the
Commission could be dangerous. People had died for less in the

past. So why put one's life or that of one's loved ones in danger to
provide information to a commission that might have no genuine
interest in establishing the truth? This attitude, borne of the
population's sad experience, initially proved to be a very serious
obstacle for the Commission.
The local human rights organizations, among them some that
had done important and courageous work during the armed
conflict, were surprisingly unprepared to assist the Commission.
It took them a long time, given the short term of our mandate, to
begin providing information. Initially at least, much of their
assistance was not particularly useful. International human
rights groups, on the other hand, had over the years prepared
extensive reports on El Salvador in general or on particular cases
or events. These provided useful background information and
served as guideposts for the Commission's investigation. These
reports and the other material that the organizations provided to
the Commission could not, of course, be deemed to prove the
truth of the allegations they described. They needed to be
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independently verified and confirmed, but to the extent that they
were carefully documented, they helped orient us.
Each side to the conflict-the government and the
FMLN-accused the other of numerous acts of violence. However,
these accusations were seldom accompanied by the type of proof
After
the Commission needed to make a credible finding.
extensive prodding, the government and military authorities
produced reams of documents relating to alleged FMLN crimes.
To our great surprise, this material was for the most part useless
for investigative purposes despite the impressive volume of paper
it consumed. We assumed that, over the years, the government
had undertaken serious investigations of terrorism and other acts
of violence attributed to the FMLN. However, that appeared not to
have been the case. At first we even thought that the government
had that information but did not wish to provide it in order
subsequently to be able to accuse the Commission of a pro-FMLN
bias. Eventually, we concluded that the government simply had
not bothered to undertake a serious effort to document the
numerous charges it made against the FMLN. The FMLN, for its
part, was by no means better prepared to substantiate its charges
against the government and appeared to have relied almost
exclusively on human rights organizations to do that work for it.
Almost immediately after assuming office, the Commission
requested the U.S. government to provide it with Information
relating to the FMLN in general and specific acts in particular.
Despite the fact that this request was reiterated on numerous
occasions, the material ultimately provided was of little value and
extremely slow in coming. Not unreasonably, the Commission
assumed, given the long U.S. involvement in the Salvadoran
conflict and its intelligence gathering capability, that the United

States would have extensive Information about the activities of
Actually, to some extent, we were lulled into
the FMLN.
complacency in carrying out our own initial investigations into
the role of the FMLN, believing instead that the promised U.S.
material would save us a great deal of time. But what we
was
surprisingly
on
this subject
received
eventually
disappointing. Although it is possible that more useful information was withheld to protect intelligence sources, what was
provided and what I saw when examining various confidential
documents makes me doubt that the United States had a great
deal of solid information relating to the FMLN that would have
been of value to us.
As a result of these problems, there were times during the
first few months of our investigations in El Salvador when I was
convinced that we would never be able to establish the truth with
regard to many of the most egregious acts of violence that had
been committed in that country. In addition to the general
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mistrust that most Salvadorans harbored against the Commission
and the fear that gripped many segments of the population,
initially it appeared that none of the military officers we

interviewed, whether or not they were implicated in any of the
cases under Investigation, would provide any useful information.
For the most part, they lied when responding to our questions.
Many of them made it quite clear, either by the manner in which

they spoke or by their body language, that their careers or their
lives were at risk if they told the truth. That was particularly the
case with the lower-ranking officers. It was obvious to us that the
military had built a defensive wall to protect itself. As we
interviewed more officers, this wall appeared to become more
formidable. Some of the officers appeared to have been coached.
Even if they were not, they knew what the "Institution"-the
military establishment--expected of them.
To understand this phenomenon, it is important to say a
word about the Salvadoran officer corps as it existed at the time
the Commission embarked on its investigation. Entry to the
officer corps is attained through the national military academy,
which a young man usually enters in his late teens after
completing secondary school. He leaves the academy with the
rank of second lieutenant and, if he does what he is told3 2 and
meets the routine expectations of his superiors, he can expect to
retire in his early or mid-fifties at the rank of lieutenant colonel or
colonel which, with the exception of three or four generals, are the
highest ranks in the Salvadoran military. Although these officers
usually do not come from wealthy families and receive relatively
low salaries and retirement pay, as a rule they end up owning
expensive residences, spend their weekends in their vacation
homes in the countryside, drive expensive cars, and otherwise
enjoy high social and economic status. Some of them also acquire

important positions in state-owned or operated enterprises after
retirement.
These people have a great incentive to complete their careers
and to stay in the service for the normal number of years. If they
are dismissed early in their careers, they usually lack the
education, social status, and economic resources needed to
embark on a professional or business career. Consequently, they
would face a very uncertain future. Also, the less time an officer
stays in the service, the less time he has to acquire wealth, which
he can usually only accomplish with the tacit acquiescence of his
colleagues who are engaged in the same endeavor. Advancement

32. Salvadoran military law requires compliance with all orders by superiors
and apparently does not recognize the right to refuse compliance with illegal

orders.
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is routine and by class or tanda in the military academy-again

with minor exceptions. What we have here is a social structure in
which each member knows that his opportunity to acquire the
"benefits" of his rank is intertwined with that of his colleagues,
particularly those in his tanda, rather than being dependent upon
his professional integrity and ability as an officer. The result is
an officer corps that is monolithic, in which everyone covers up
for everyone else, where one's principal loyalty is to his tanda and
to the protection of the "system." Departure from these norms is
treated as disloyalty that can have serious consequences. Given
this environment, it is not surprising that the Commission
initially had little success in getting any information from the
members of the officer corps, including those who were known to
have had doubts about the behavior of some of their colleagues.
All of them, moreover, seemed to have great faith in the ability of
the system to cover up, to protect them, and to punish those who
talked. As one officer put it, "most officers knew who had done
what, but we also knew that none of us would tell on them, and
that if we did, we would be dead."
B. The Wall Begins to Crumble
Our investigation began to make progress some three months
after we arrived in El Salvador. That is, towards the end of
October and the beginning of November 1992, various people,
including some military officers, began to talk. What happened?
My own sense is that at least three interrelated factors played an
important role. One was the report of the so-called Ad Hoc
Commission. The second was the outcome of the 1992 U.S.
presidential election. The third was the belief that the United
States was providing the Commission with vast amounts of
information.

The Ad Hoc Commission, also a creature of the Peace
Accords," was established to review the past performance of
Salvadoran military officers by reference to their human rights
record, their professional competence, and their capacity to
Composed of three
function in a democratic society.
distinguished Salvadoran civilians, with two retired Salvadoran
generals assigned to it as advisers, this body was empowered to
recommend the dismissal, demotion, or retention of officers based
on the above criteria. The government, in turn, was under an
obligation to comply with these recommendations within a period
of two months. There is strong evidence to suggest that the
government and the military only agreed to the establishment of

33.

ChapultepecAgreement, supra note 2. ch. 1. para. 3, at 49.
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the Ad Hoc Commission because they were convinced that it
would not dare to discharge its responsibilities honestly.3 4 At
most, they thought the Commission would call for the dismissal of
a few low-ranking officers. That is what had happened in the past
with similar bodies, and there was little reason to assume that
this one would act differently. But, to the great surprise of many
in El Salvador, it did. The result was a secret report presented to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the President
of El Salvador. The report, which was eventually leaked to the
press, charged more than one hundred officers, including the

Minister and Deputy Minister of Defense as well as the Chief of
the General Staff, with serious violations of human rights and
called for their dismissal from the service. 35 The three members
of the Ad Hoc Commission delivered their report in New York and,
fearing for their lives, remained outside El Salvador for some time.
The report of the Ad Hoc Commission, coming some three
months after the Truth Commission had begun its work, had a
very perceptible impact on the work of the Truth Commission. It
was the first clear indication-the first signal-received by the
people of El Salvador that the days of "business as usual," of
military impunity and cover-ups, might be over. Suddenly people
no longer looked at the Truth Commission with their accustomed
cynicism. If three Salvadorans had dared to undertake an honest
investigation despite the risks this action exposed them to, it was
certainly more likely that three distinguished foreigners working
under UN auspices could do no less. Thus, some individuals
implicated in serious acts of violence no longer felt sure that they
would be protected. Because the Truth Commission had the
power to make recommendations concerning criminal trials and
amnesties, and might be able to help implicated parties get
asylum abroad, a few of them began to provide the Commission
with important Information. That information in turn elicited
testimony from others who then realized that the protective dike
they had constructed was beginning to leak. Moreover, the Ad
Hoc Commission had proven to the country at large that the
power and control of the government and the military was

beginning to weaken, and that things were changing in El
Salvador. Therefore, many more ordinary citizens also came
forward to provide evidence, still very fearful, but now with
greater confidence in the integrity of the process.
Salvadorans also perceived the following as harbingers of a
major change in U.S. policy toward El Salvador: the defeat of U.S.

34.

See Arnson, supra note 16, at 8.

35. Tim Golden, Salvadoran Panel Calls for Purge of Defense Chlef and 110
Officers, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1992, at Al.
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President George Bush in the 1992 elections, the belief of many
Salvadorans that the Republican Party in the United States was
more likely than the Democratic Party to protect the Salvadoran
military and its allies, and the fact that Democrats in the U.S.
Congress had been less supportive of U.S. involvement in El
Salvador.
At the very least, Salvadorans expected that the

Clinton Administration would be even more willing than its
predecessor to support the work of the Truth Commission. These
considerations convinced some more people to cooperate with us.
Our efforts were also helped by the knowledge in El Salvador that
I had received a security clearance to examine U.S. documents for
the Commission. Of course, no Salvadorans knew how very
limited my clearance was. Hence, the FMLN leadership, the
Salvadoran government, and the military all assumed that the
Commission knew much more than it actually did. We did not
discourage that belief because it helped convince some individuals
to come forward with information either against the government
or the FMLN.
The more information we obtained, the more new information
and leads came our way. Of course, that Is usually what happens
in any investigation. As the evidence accumulated, it had to be
carefully verified. In trying to do so, we confronted a serious
obstacle: the country was awash in rumors of all sorts. Moreover,
trading in rumors had become a national pastime. They were
often passed on with such self-assurance and conviction that
uninitiated foreigners could easily mistake them for the truth.
The witness usually believed the rumor, and if we did not
immediately accept the information as true, he or she would
assume either that we were protecting someone or that we were
not serious about our investigation. Wars have this effect on
people. Nonetheless, this state of affairs did not make our task
any easier. We lost valuable time trying to find sources with firsthand information, ending up quite often with little to show for our
effort. For example, one of our most frustrating experiences was
trying to identify members of death squads and their patrons.
Everyone in El Salvador supposedly "knew" who was involved
with death squads. We were regularly told, "of course, It Is well

known that X provided the money."

And, it was almost

impossible to come up with real proof. That was particularly true
with regard to the wealthy landowners and business people who
allegedly financed these groups. Lacking the power to subpoena
financial records or telephone logs, or to obtain information
allegedly gathered by U.S. intelligence agencies monitoring
telephone transmissions between Miami and El Salvador-some of
the money was supposed to have been sent by Salvadoran
expatriates living in the United States and Guatemala-the
Commission had to rely on other evidence, which was seldom very
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helpful. Some death squad members talked, but they were for the
most part low-level operatives whose information regarding their
civilian backers tended to be largely anecdotal. That was hardly
good enough evidence for charging somebody with running or
financing death squads. And, when such charges were not made,
a new rumor surfaced: the Commission had made a deal to
38
protect the wealthy civilians.

V.

NAMING NAMES

From the very beginning of the investigation, the
Commissioners assumed that our final report would identify the
individuals who had committed the serious acts of violence to
which the Commission's mandate referred. However, we did not
formally discuss the subject in the first four months of our work.
All three of us had quite naturally assumed that the investigation
would not be complete unless those responsible for these acts
were identified. That seemed too obvious to require much
discussion and explains why, from the very beginning, we focused
our inquiry on the following questions: what happened, which
side of the conflict was responsible, who were the victims, and

who were the perpetrators?
Until the issue became the subject of a heated debate in and

outside of El Salvador towards the end of our investigation, it had
certainly never occurred to me that the Report would not name
names. On first reading the Commission's mandate, I concluded
that one of our tasks was to identify those who had committed the
serious acts of violence we were required to investigate. My
colleagues, as I learned later, had reached the same conclusion.
After all, the Parties to the Peace Accords wanted "the complete
truth be made known."3 7 For that purpose, they empowered the
Commission to investigate the "serious acts of violence that have
occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society urgently
demands that the public should know the truth."38 How could we

make known "the complete truth" about a murder or massacre,
for example, without identifying the killers if we knew their
identity?

36. Douglas Farah, Assassinations, Threats of Reprisals Besiege Shaky
Salvadoran Peace Process, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1993, at A14. But see Thomas
Buergenthal, Investigating Salvadoran Death Squads, Letter to the Editor, WASH.
PosT, Nov. 30, 1993, at A24 (rebutting Mr. Farah's allegations that the
Commission withheld valid information regarding the Salvadoran death squads).
37. Mexlco Agreements, supra note 2, at 29.
38. Id.
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Of course, if the Parties had not wanted us to name names,
they could easily have said so. However, the mandate for the
Commission did not contain such a restriction. Moreover, our
initial contacts with the Parties indicated that they assumed that
we would identify individuals responsible for serious acts of
violence. The government representatives, including President
Alfredo Cristiani and members of the Military High Command,
told us repeatedly during our initial visits to El Salvador that our
task was to identify the "rotten apples" within the "Institution."
The Institution itself had to be protected. The government
representatives told us: "Individuals and not the 'Institution' were
responsible for the violations that the government side had
committed." The FMLN also repeatedly made it clear that the
guilty had to be identified. Of course, neither side expected our
investigation to be very thorough or to contain much evidence
implicating the "big fish."
The attitude of the government began to change dramatically
as it became known that the Commission had gathered incriminating evidence against high-ranking government officials,
particularly General Ren6 Emilio Ponce, the Minister of Defense,
and General Juan Orland Zepeda, his Vice Minister, as well as
other officers comprising the military establishment. Although

many of the same officers had already been named by the Ad Hoc
Commission, that body had merely prepared a list without
specifying the offenses committed. On the other hand, the Truth
Commission was going to present evidence and make public its
Report, which posed a much more serious threat. Moreover,
some of the officers, particularly General Ponce, had been
instrumental in convincing his military colleagues to go along
with the Peace Accords. He was not only the highest ranking
military officer in El Salvador, but also the undisputed leader of
his tanda, which was known as the tandona because it was the
largest class ever to graduate from the military academy. The
tandona controlled the military establishment. Most, if not all,
brigade commanders were members of the tandona. Together,
they had the power to make life very difficult for President
Cristiani and to impede, if not scuttle, his efforts to proceed with
the implementation of the Peace Accords.
The power and influence of the tandona, rumors that "naming
names" would lead to a military coup in El Salvador, and claims
by many well-intentioned individuals in El Salvador and outside
the country that the publication of names by the Truth
very
national reconciliation
Commission would make
difficult-that it would be like pouring gasoline on a smoldering
fire-prompted the government to mount a fierce diplomatic
campaign to force us to omit names from the Report. President
Cristiani led the campaign by urging various Latin American
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leaders, the United States, and the UN Secretary-General to use
their power and influence to prevent the publication of names.

He also sent a ministerial delegation to meet with us in New York
for the same purpose. The arguments against publication ranged
from the danger to the peace process and national reconciliation,
to intimations of imminent coups, and claims of the government's
inability to prevent retaliation against those who provided
information to the Commission. The government also attempted
to convince the FMLN to agree with its position. The FMLN and
the government together, as the Parties to the Peace Accords,
presumably had it in their power to amend the Commission's
mandate and to require us not to publish any names. Some in
the FMLN leadership were quite sympathetic to this effort and
implied as much in conversations with us; a majority was
opposed. Eventually, after a lengthy and apparently acrimonious
debate within the FMLN high command, the FMLN informed the
Commission that the Peace Accords required the publication of
names.
The diplomatic campaign mounted by the Salvadoran
government against the publication of names by the Truth
Commission made it necessary for the Commissioners to explain
our position to government leaders in the United States, Europe,
and Latin America who were being lobbied by the Salvadorans.
The fact that one Commissioner was a former President of
Colombia and another a former Foreign Minister of Venezuela
gave us easy access to these foreign leaders. The Commission's
stature also established the requisite credibility to explain why we
believed that our mandate required us to name names and why in
our judgment this action would promote rather than impede
national reconciliation in El Salvador. It should be noted, in this
connection, that all three of us were unanimous on this subject
and never doubted that, unless both Parties decided to amend our
mandate, we were legally and morally obliged to identify those we
found to be guilty of the serious abuses we had been
investigating. In the Report, we explained our decision as follows:
In the peace agreements, the Parties made it quite clear that it
was necessary that the "complete truth be made known", and that
was why the Commission was established. Now, the whole truth

cannot be told without naming names. After all, the Commission
was not asked to write an academic report on El Salvador, it was
asked to investigate and describe exceptionally important acts of
violence and to recommend measures to prevent the repetition of
such acts. This task cannot be performed in the abstract,
suppressing information (for example, the names of person
responsible for such acts) where there is reliable testimony

available, especially when the persons identified [continue to]
occupy senior positions

and perform official functions directly

related to the violations or the cover-up of violations. Not to name
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names would be to reinforce the very impunity to which the Parties
instructed the Commission to put an end.3 9
It should also be pointed out that in El Salvador, unlike in some
other countries with similar histories, it was known for the most
part which side to the conflict had committed what acts and who

the victims were. What was often not generally known and what
engendered acrimonious debates was who committed the acts and
The search for the
who ordered them to be committed.
"intellectual authors" of these offenses was a national obsession.
Many of the intellectual authors were still holding influential
positions. To refrain from exposing them would have amounted
to yet another cover-up. In our view, national reconciliation
would be harmed rather than helped by a Commission report that
told only part of the truth. If there had been an effective justice
system in El Salvador at the time of the publication of our Report,
it could have used the Report as a basis for an independent
In these
investigation of those guilty of the violations.
circumstances, it might have made some sense for the
Commission not to publish the names and, instead, to transmit
the relevant information to the police or courts for appropriate
action. But one reason for establishing the Commission was that
the Parties to the Peace Accords knew, and the Truth Commission
had ample evidence to confirm, that the Salvadoran justice
system was corrupt, ineffective, and incapable of rendering
impartial judgments in so-called "political" cases.
President Cristiani's
We were also told to heed
warnings-that he knew the dangers facing his country and that
the release of names would undermine national reconciliation.
Those were the arguments made by his emissaries in various
nations' capitals. Of course, we had high regard for President
Cristiani-without his imaginative leadership the Peace Accords
would never have been signed-and we certainly could not claim

to know his country better than he did. But it was also public
knowledge that he was under great pressure, including thinly
veiled threats against him personally from the tandona, which
wanted to protect its members. We were convinced, moreover,
that the failure of the Truth Commission to produce an honest
report would seriously undermine the peace process. The fact
that the publication of the Report with names did not produce all
the dire consequences prophesied by those who wanted us to
leave them out would suggest that we were right in not caving in
to the pressures to which we were subjected.

39.

Report, supra note 1, at 25.
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VI. THE DRAFrING PROCESS
The Commission's mandate required it to prepare a report
containing findings on serious acts of violence that had been
committed in El Salvador, as well as recommendations designed
both to prevent the repetition of these acts and to encourage
national reconciliation.
The process of drafting the findings
consisted of a number of stages. Usually one or more staff
investigators were assigned to a case. Their draft would be
supplemented by other staffers before being submitted to one of

three senior lawyers, selected by the Commissioners to serve as
their special advisers. 4 0 The latter would review the draft as well
as all evidence that was relied upon to substantiate the findings.
Depending upon the quality of the product, the special advisers
would accept the case report, revise it themselves, send it back for
further study or assign it to another investigator or group of
investigators to check out additional evidence. The special
advisers and selected staff members also met regularly with the
Commissioners to discuss the drafts in progress. Once the
special advisers were satisfied with a text, they would pass the
"final version" to the Commissioners, who frequently revised it
again in consultation with those who had worked on the draft.
Since the Commissioners themselves often had interrogated many
witnesses and guided the investigations, particularly in the major
cases, they were very familiar with the evidence as well as the
strengths and weaknesses of the case. The Commissioners also
had access to some highly confidential sources which provided
information that could not always be fully shared with all staff
members. 4 1 Their familiarity with the cases and the available
evidence gave the Commissioners a sound and independent basis
for reviewing and assessing the proposed findings. Their review of
a draft often resulted in a request for further investigation, a
decision to call or recall an additional witness, and yet another

40. Because of administrative problems relating to the operation of the
Commission staff in the first few months of its stay in El Salvador, the
Commissioners decided that each of us should name one highly experienced,

outside lawyer to serve as our special adviser for the preparation of the Report.
This decision produced a team of three outstanding lawyers consisting of
Professor Douglass Cassel, Executive Director, International Human Rights Law
Institute of DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois; Dr. Guillermo Fernandez de Soto,
former Deputy Foreign Minister of Colombia and former Senior Attorney, Inter-

American Commission on Human Rights; and Dr. Luis Herrera Marcano, former
Legal Adviser of the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry and former Dean of the Law
Faculty of the Universidad Central, Caracas, Venezuela.
41. To protect witnesses and confidential sources, access to some
information was available to the staff only on a need-to-know basis.
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draft had to be approved by all three
draft.
The final
42
Commissioners.
The Commissioners did not focus on the subject of general
recommendations until we had obtained a good understanding of
the violence to which the people of El Salvador had been
subjected and its causes. This was only natural because the
general recommendations would have to address needed
institutional and normative changes, which presupposed such
understanding. The specific recommendations, on the other
hand, grew out of the particular findings of each case. Once the
Commissioners began to think about general recommendations,

we designated a senior staff member to solicit and gather
suggestions from different groups and institutions in and outside
of El Salvador. Somewhat later, the Commissioners and some of
the senior advisers discussed ideas for recommendations with
representatives of various Salvadoran institutions, professional
bodies, government officials, FMLN commanders, and foreign
experts with experience in El Salvador. The general recommendations that ultimately found their way into the Report were
the product of the ideas that emerged from these discussions and
the Commissioners' analysis of the objectives reflected in the
undertakings assumed by the Parties to the Peace Accords. The
Parties, who knew their country and its problems better than we
did, had in these agreements themselves presented a blueprint for
a free, democratic, and peaceful El Salvador. These agreements
focused on reforms of the judiciary, the armed forces, and the
police, as well as on the protection of human rights and other
areas of relevance to the avoidance of the abuses that
The Commission's own
characterized the old El Salvador.
findings provided ample proof, moreover, that the changes and
reforms that the Peace Accords sought to effect were
indispensable for the desired transformation of El Salvador. The
Commissioners consequently saw the Peace Accords as an
authoritative guide and conceptual basis for the formulation of
the Commission's general recommendation.
The most surprising fact about this drafting process Is that
the Commissioners never once disagreed among themselves with
regard to any final decision concerning matters dealt with in the
Report. While we sometimes had lengthy discussions regarding

different aspects of a case, some piece of evidence, or the way in
which a case was written up, ultimately all issues were resolved
in a manner fully satisfactory to the three of us. In fact, we never
had to take a vote. Despite our very different backgrounds, we

42.

All references to confidential sources were removed from the final text to

protect those who provided the evidence.
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tended to see most issues confronting us in very much the same
way and, if we did not at the outset, we always came together at
the end. We did not have to work out difficult compromises
because our basic agreement on most issues made voting or
compromise solutions unnecessary.

VII. THE REPORT

The Commission's Report, entitled "From Madness to Hope,"
consists of one volume of findings and two volumes of annexes.
The three volumes were published as UN Security Council
documents.' 3 Annex I contains, inter alia, the full findings of the
forensic scientists retained by the Truth Commission to investigate the El Mozote massacre as well as the texts of the Salvadoran
Peace Accords. Annex II is a compilation of statistical information
of the testimony and complaints received by the Commission. It
also contains a list of names of individuals who were identified as
victims of acts of violence.
The Commission's findings are set out in Volume I. This
volume consists of: an analysis of the Commission's mandate, a
chronology of the violence that engulfed El Salvador from 1980 to
1991, the Commission's conclusions relating to the acts of
violence it investigated, and its recommendations.
An introduction to the volume sets out the Commissioners' reflections on
the violence chronicled in the Report and our hopes for national
reconciliation in El Salvador. We were profoundly moved by what
we learned about the human suffering of the people of that small
country, and by what we discovered about their resilience and

their hopes for a peaceful future. These sentiments are reflected
both in the introduction and epilogue of the Report.
The chronology of violence provides an historical overview of
the relevant period. Designed to supply the context through
snapshots of the conflict and its effect on the country, this yearby-year summary of events complements the main part of the
Report. While the main section necessarily focuses on a small
number of cases and events, the summary sketches the larger
picture, setting the stage upon which the human tragedy played
out. The summary also mentions some cases and events the
Commission could not fully investigate but considered sufficiently
important to place on record somewhere in the Report.

43.

See Report, supra note 1, Annexes I-II.
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A. The Applicable Law
The discussion relating to the Commission's mandate deals,
among other things, with the "applicable law."44
Here the
Commission addressed the fact that its mandate is silent on the
question of the legal norms to be applied in determining whaxt is
meant by the "serious acts of violence" it was to investigate. Not
all acts of violence committed in the civil war, however serious in
terms of loss of life or limb, could be deemed to fall within that
definition; in war as in peace there are legitimate and Illegitimate,
lawful and unlawful, uses of force that cause serious harm.
Hence, despite the fact that its mandate did not spell out the
applicable legal norms, the Commission concluded that "the
concept of serious acts of violence ... does not exist in a normative vacuum and must therefore be analyzed on the basis of
45
certain relevant principles of law."
In the Commission's opinion, the legal principles that defined
the scope of its mandate were to be found in those rules of
international human rights law and international humanitarian
law binding on the state of El Salvador, its government, and the
insurgents seeking to defeat it. As far as human rights law was
concerned, the Commission emphasized that El Salvador had
assumed various human rights obligations as a member of both
the United Nations and the Organization of American States.
Additionally, it had obligations as a state party to the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 46 and the
American Convention on Human Rights. 47 These treaties entered
into force for El Salvador before 1980 and therefore were
applicable during the entire conflict. As both treaties prohibit the
suspension of certain fundamental rights, such as the right to life
and the right not to be tortured, even in time of war or national
emergency, their provisions were relevant to the Salvadoran
conflict and needed to be taken into account by the Commission
in discharging its responsibilities. 48
It is interesting to note, in this connection, that in analyzing
the relevance of international human rights law to the task as-

44. Id. at20.
45. Id.
46. International Covenant on civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature,December 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967)
(entered into force March 23. 1976).
47. The American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature,
November 22, 1969, OAS. Treaty Series, No. 36, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970)
(entered into force July 18, 1978).
48. See Report, supra note 1, at 20-21.
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signed to it, the Commission reached the following conclusion,
among others:
It is true that, in theory, international human rights law is
applicable only to Governments, while in some armed conflicts in-

ternational humanitarian law is binding on both sides: in other
words, binding on both insurgents and Government forces. How-

ever, it must be recognized that when insurgents assume government powers in territories under their control, they too can be
required to observe certain human rights 4 9obligations that are
binding on the State under international law.

Because the FMLN claimed to control some regions of El Salvador,
the Commission determined that in those areas the FMLN, as the
de facto governing authority, was under a legal obligation not to
violate those basic international human rights that were binding

on the state of El Salvador even under the prevailing emergency
conditions. Holding insurgent forces responsible for violations of
human rights under these circumstances is an important
precedent that might be applied to other internal armed conflicts.
The international humanitarian law provisions that the
Commission found applicable to the Salvadoran conflict were
Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,50 and
Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions.5 1
These
instruments had been ratified by El Salvador before 1980 and
applied to non-international armed conflicts.
These treaties,
together with the international human rights instruments
referred to above, provided the Commission with the normative
standards it needed to be in a position to assess the legitimacy
and legality of the serious acts of violence that had been committed by both sides to the Salvadoran conflict. Despite the fact that
the Commission was not a court, it had to draw on these legal
principles to determine what cases and facts to investigate, how
to evaluate the evidence, and what findings and recommendations
to make.

49. Id. at 20.

50.

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded

and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signatureAug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and

Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, openedfor signatureAug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 35 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva

Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950);

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
openedfor signatureAug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950).

51.

Protocol to the Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of Victims

of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391.
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B. The Cases
The acts of violence attributable to the government and those
attributable to the FMLN are treated in separate sections of the
Report. Before analyzing them, it is relevant to note that the
Commission concluded that its findings revealed the following two
types of cases falling within the scope of its mandate:
(a) Individual cases or acts which, by their nature, outraged
Salvadorian society and/or international opinion;
(b) A series of individual cases with similar characteristics
revealing a systemic pattern of violence or ill-treatment which,
taken together, equally outraged Salvadorian society, especially

since their aim was to intimidate certain sectors of that society.5 2

In other words, the Commission's Report describes some
notorious individual cases that had shocked public opinion, as
well as cases that were paradigmatic of a practice or pattern of
violence which characterized the conduct of one side or the other
in a given period of time and, in their totality, had the same disturbing effect on the public. Sometimes, notorious individual

cases also exemplified more generalized patterns of violence.
Since cases illustrative of patterns of violence tended to be quite
numerous-extraudicial
executions,
tortures,
and forced
disappearances-the Commission could only deal with one or two
of them as examples.
The Commissioners had assumed and hoped that we would
find a more or less equal number of serious acts of violence
attributable to each side to the conflict. That would have made
our task politically easier and given us the credibility that derives
from the public's perception of even-handedness. None of us was
so politically naive as to be unaware of this reality, nor was there
one among us who had a special interest or desire to favor or
protect either side to the conflict. We were convinced, moreover,
that the success of our mission and our personal and collective
reputations depended on our ability to write a completely honest
and impartial report. We soon found, however, that our hope for a
quantitatively balanced report could not be realized. Despite the
massive wartime propaganda to the contrary, the government side
had committed a substantially larger number of egregious acts
than the FMLN. Moreover, some of these acts--among them the
El Mozote massacre in which hundreds of innocent civilians were
slaughtered-had no comparable counterparts among the crimes
committed by the FMLN.
The complaints received by the
Commission provided some revealing statistical evidence of this

52.

Report, supra note 1, at 19.

UNITED NATIONS TRUTH COMMISSION

1994]

imbalance.
This is how the Commission summarized the
information:
The Commission... registered more than 22,000 complaints
of serious acts of violence that occurred in El Salvador between

January 1980 and July 1991. Over 7,000 were received directly at
the Commission's offices in various locations. The remainder were
received through governmental and non-governmental institutions.
Over 60 per cent of all complaints concerned extrajudicial
executions, over 25 per cent concerned enforced disappearances,
and over 20 per cent included complaints of torture.
Those giving testimony attributed almost 85 per cent of cases
to agents of the State, paramilitary groups allied to them, and the
death squads.

Armed forces personnel were accused in almost 60 per cent of
complaints, members of the security forces in approximately 25 per
cent. members of military escorts and civil defence units in
approximately 20 per cent, and members of the death squads in
more than 10 per cent of cases. The complaints
registered accused
5
FMLN in approximately 5 per cent of cases. 3

Elsewhere in the Report, the Commission notes that it "registered
more than 800 complaints of serious acts of violence attributed to
FMLN,"M and that "[nlearly half the complaints against FMLN
concern deaths, mostly extrajudicial executions. The rest concern
enforced disappearances and forcible recruitment."5 5 Considering
that the Commission registered more than 7,000 first-hand
complaints altogether, it is not surprising that more space is
devoted in the Report to violations by the government than the
FMLN.
In the section of the Report describing the serious acts of
violence committed by the government side,58 the Commission
treated the 1989 murders of six Jesuit priests as a case that was
"illustrative" of the violence used against perceived opponents of
the state. The Commission found that these individuals, all
administrators and faculty members of a Jesuit university in El
Salvador, were executed on orders of a small group of military
commanders, including the then Chief of Staff, General Rend
Emilio Ponce, who later became Minister of Defense. Further, a
much larger number of officials were involved in the subsequent

cover-up. The victims' only crime was that they spoke out against
the policies of the government and were perceived as FMLN
sympathizers. 5 7 This section of the Report also deals with other
cases of extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances,
massacres of peasants, and death squad executions. The 1980

53.

Id. at 43.

54. Id. at 44.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 43-147.

57. See Id. at 45.
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assassination of Archbishop Romero 58 by a death squad organized
by Roberto D'Aubuisson, a former major in the Salvadoran army
and the founder of the ARENA Party, receives considerable
attention. The Report singles it out as a case illustrative of the
operations of death squads in El Salvador and the impunity with
which they carried out their activities.5 9 Among the extrajudiclal

executions attributed to the military, which were common in El
Salvador at different periods, the Commission describes the
killings of four American churchwomen 6° and a group of Dutch
journalists, 6 1 as well as various other assassinations. Among
these, the most notorious are the executions committed in San
Francisco Guajoyo in 1980,62 Las Hojas in 1983,6 and San
Sebastian in 1988.64
In the early 1980s, the Salvadoran military committed a
number of large-scale massacres of campesinos. The massacres
took place in the course of military campaigns designed to deprive
the FMLN of civilian support in certain areas of the country that
the insurgents sought to control. The Commission's Report deals
with three of these massacres: El Mozote,6 5 Sumpul River,6 and
El Calabozo. 67

While the El Mozote massacre has become the

most notorious of these atrocities, hundreds of people died in the
other two as well. Despite claims by the Reagan Administration
that these massacres, particularly El Mozote, never took place, 6 s
the Commission found overwhelming evidence of the Salvadoran
military's responsibility for them.
The Commission also found overwhelming evidence that the
FMLN engaged in assassinations and other serious acts of
violence against those it perceived as opponents. It should be
emphasized, in this connection, that the FMLN, like the government, murdered certain political opponents on the theory that "he
who is not with us is against us." The Report also deals with the
FMLN's summary execution of a large number of mayors, which
took place between 1985 and 1988, as illustrative of this
practice.6 9 It is worth noting that although the FMLN did not

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 127.
See Id. at 127-38.
Id. at 62-66.
Id. at 69-75.
Id. at 54-57.
Id. at 76-80.
Id. at 80-86.
Id. at 114-21.
Id. at 121-24.

67,

Id. at 125-26.

68.

See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S

PANEL ON EL SALVADOR 20-21 (1993).
69. Report, supranote 1. at 148-53.
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deny that it had ordered these executions, it claimed that they
were justified on the ground that the officials were involved in
counter-insurgency activities and in helping to recruit paramilitary forces. As such, they were legitimate military targets.
The Commission rejected this argument on two grounds. First, it
found no evidence for the claim that the mayors were combatants
or, even if they were, that they had lost their lives in combat
operations. Second, even if the mayors were government spies, as
the FMLN claimed, it was illegal to execute them without a proper
trial. On the latter point, the Commission recognized that
although international humanitarian law and international
human rights law do not "prohibit belligerents from punishing, in
areas under their control, individuals who commit acts that,
according to the applicable laws, are criminal in nature," both
sources of law "expressly prohibit the passing of sentences and
the carrying out of executions without previous judgement
pronounced by a regularly constituted independent and impartial
tribunal attaching [sic] all the judicial guarantees generally

recognized as indispensable." 70 The Commission found that these
requirements were not met in any of the cases it examined.
Among the other extrajudicial executions involving the FMLN
7x
that the Commission considered were the 1985 Zona Rosa case,
and the 1991 killing of two wounded U.S. military advisers who
had survived a helicopter crash.7 2 The Commission determined
that both of these acts constituted serious violations of
international humanitarian law.
As previously noted, the Commission found it much easier to
identify the government military officers who had ordered or
committed serious acts of violence than FMLN commanders
responsible for comparable practices. In the case of a government
military officer, once we knew the date and place of an event, we
would often be able to identify the military unit and its
commanding officers.
This information enabled us to fix
individual responsibility after some follow-up investigation. Since
the FMLN did not provide this information and our other sources
frequently did not have it, the Commission found it almost
impossible to fix individual responsibility for many acts attributed
to the FMLN. A combination of factors and lucky breaks allowed
us to hold some FMLN commanders individually responsible for

70. Id. at 151-52.
71. Id. at 153.
72. Id. at 167. The Zona Rosa case involved an indiscriminate attack by
FMLN urban guerrillas on a restaurant in San Salvador in which four off-duty
U.S. Embassy guards, nine civilians, and one of the assailants were killed.
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the murder of a number of the mayors. 73 To our great regret, we
simply did not have the requisite evidence with regard to others.
It is also appropriate to say a word about the failure of the
Truth Commission to deal with the role of the United States and
its responsibility for some of the acts of violence that were committed in El Salvador. The Commissioners decided very early on
that we would identify all persons-whether U.S. military or
intelligence officers or any other foreign nationals-if we
concluded that they had engaged in serious acts of violence falling
within the Commission's mandate. However, we did not believe
that our mandate authorized us to embark on an analysis of the
policies of the United States or of any other country that may
have contributed to the violence visited upon the people of El
Salvador. If the Parties to the Peace Accords had wanted us to

undertake this task, they should have said so, but that they did
not do. Moreover, had we adopted a different approach to this
question, we would have been compelled to embark on an
investigation of the policies and practices of the Cold War
adversaries in Central America-the United States, Cuba,
Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union-for which we were not equipped
and lacked the requisite resources, let alone the time. Although
the American public and news media were preoccupied with the
role of the United States in El Salvador, we concluded that this
was an issue the people of the United States and their duly
elected representatives were better equipped than we were to
investigate and to resolve within the framework of their own
democratic system. 7 4 It is also worth noting that the Commission
did not find sufficient credible evidence-there were of course
many rumors and allegations that were investigated-tying U.S.
military or intelligence officers to any specific act of violence. If
we had had that evidence, we would have made it public in the
Report.

73.

It is simply not true, as some of these commanders have claimed in

public pronouncements, that they were Identified by name only because they
cooperated with the Commission more fully than other units of the FMLN. We

were able to identify them principally because they were more careless than the
others in covering their tracks.
74. Although various statements by officials of the Reagan Administration
were quoted in at least one case which was examined by the Commission, they
were designed to show that the Salvadoran authorities reacted to U.S. pressure In
conducting investigations into serious acts of violence. See Report, supra note 1,
at 62 (discussing the case of the American churchwomen).
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C. The Recommendations
The Parties to the Peace Accords-the government and the
FMLN-accepted as binding on them the recommendations of the
Truth Commission. The relevant provisions of the Commission's
mandate are Articles 3 and 10. They read as follows:
The mandate of the Commission shall include
3.
recommending the legal, political or administrative measures
which can be inferred from the results of the investigation. Such
recommendations may include measures to prevent the repetition
75
of such acts, and initiatives to promote national reconciliation.
undertake to carry out the Commission's
10. The Parties
78
recommendations.

The Report contains a lengthy chapter setting out the
Commission's recommendations.7 7 The chapter begins with a
short analysis of the causes and conditions which, in the opinion
of the Commission, contributed to or made possible the many
serious acts of violence described in the Report. More than any
part of the Report, these few pages capture the Commissioners'
overall perceptions of the "reality" that was the El Salvador they
were asked to investigate. The most telling paragraph reads as
follows:
The internal armed conflict between opposing forces grew in
intensity and magnitude.... The more bloody the conflict became.
and the more widespread, the greater the power of the military
hierarchy and of those who commanded armed insurgent groups.

The outcome of that vicious circle was a situation in which certain
elements of society found themselves immune from any
governmental or political restraints and thus forged for themselves
the 'most abject impunity. It was they who wielded the real power

of the State, expressed in the most primitive terms, while the
executive, legislative and judicial branches were unable to play any
real role as branches of government. The sad fact is that they were

into mere facades with marginal governtransformed, in practice,
78
mental authority.

The notion of a government as a mere "facade" behind which
hid the ugly reality of a state hijacked by a vicious criminal
enterprise best described the phenomenon and the many things
we saw and heard.

75.
76.
77.
78.

Mexico Agreements, supra note 2, at 30.
Mexico Agreements, supra note 2, at 31.
Report, supra note 1, at 172.
Id. at 173.
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Another paragraph in the Report points to the factors that
made these conditions possible:
None of the three branches of Government-Judicial, legislative
or executive-was capable of restraining the military's
overwhelming control of society. The judiciary was weakened as it
fell victim to intimidation and the foundations were laid for its
corruption; since it had never enjoyed genuine institutional
independence from the legislative and executive branches, its
ineffectiveness steadily increased until it became, through its
inaction or its appalling submissiveness, a factor which
contributed to the tragedy suffered by the country. The various,
frequently opportunistic, alliances which political leaders
(legislators as well as members of the executive branch) forged with
the military establishment and with members of the judiciary had
the effect of further weakening civilian control over the military,
police and security
forces, all of which formed part of the military
79
establishment.
The gradual perversion of governmental authority by the
military, with the willing or unwitting collaboration of civilian
authorities, and the military's total immunity for its acts, however
criminal, was the cancer that invaded the fabric of Salvadoran
civil society and eroded Its ability to protect itself against this evil
disease.
The death squads thrived in this climate.
Their
evolution and transformation is at once sadly ironic and typical of
the civilian-military alliances that were forged in the early 1980s
and of their consequences.8 0 These armed groups were initially
organized and financed by wealthy civilians to protect themselves
against real or imagined enemies and to silence political

opponents.

The death squads' operatives tended to be mainly

active or retired military personnel, usually drawn from the
security forces, who were brought in to carry out the killings,
tortures and disappearances.
The military officers gradually
wrested control of the death squads away from their civilian
masters. Integrated into the military security apparatus, the
death squads were then used to extort money from wealthy
families-apparently including some of their former masters-and
to kill and torture individuals they deemed "subversives."
To ensure that the past would not repeat itself, the
Commission recommended a series of changes designed to
transform El Salvador into a country having a democratic form of
government, where the rule of law and human rights are
observed, and where there is tolerance for opposing views. 81 The
Commission observed, in this connection, that "[tlhe consolidation
of the supremacy of civilian authority in Salvadorian society and

79. Id. at 172-73.
80. See Ld.
81. Id. at 174-75.
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necessary subordination of the armed forces to it stem directly
from the democratic concept of the rule of law, the primordial
value of the dignity of the human person and, hence, full respect
for his rights."s 2 To this end, the Commission recommended
reforms in the administration of justice system, focusing on the
need to develop an independent judiciary, changing the process of
training and selecting judges, and limiting the power of the
Supreme Court in general and its president in particular. The
Commission also strongly supported the establishment of the
National Civilian Police, a new entity provided for in the Peace
Accords, and urged that this police force assume various criminal
investigatory functions which, in the past, were the exclusive
domain of police units subject to military jurisdiction. To ensure
that the massive violations of human rights so characteristic of El
Salvador's past not be repeated, the Commission recommended a
whole series of specific measures involving new laws and
institutions relating to human rights and their guarantees.83
In its recommendations, the Commission also addressed the
revival of death squad activities. The Commission was convinced
that these groups had merely suspended their operations, that
their command structure was still largely intact, and that they
could be reactivated on short notice. Because the Commission's
own investigations had been largely ineffective in piercing the veil
of secrecy that shielded these groups, it recommended that the
government continue the investigations with the help of foreign
police authorities. This recommendation was prompted by the
conclusion of the Commissioners that our own investigation of
death squads had been greatly hampered by a lack of modem
criminal investigative techniques available to the police of certain

countries, and that the only way to root out the death squads was

to seek the assistance of these police agencies. s4
The Commission could have recommended that the
individuals identified as responsible for the serious acts of
violence described in the Report be tried by Salvadoran courts.
However, such a recommendation would have made sense only if
the Commissioners believed that the justice system of that
country was capable of doing justice, which we did not. Although
the Peace Accords had ended the armed conflict and called for
substantial reforms in the justice system, very few of these
changes had been implemented or were likely to be implemented
in the near future. This meant that the same judges who were in
office during the war, including some accused by the Truth

82.

Id. at 174.

83.
84.

Id. at 182-84.
Id. at 180.
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Commission of covering up various offenses, would be the ones to
adjudicate these charges. As stated in the Report:
These considerations confront the Commission with a serious
dilemma.

The question is not whether the guilty should be

punished but whether justice can be done. Public morality
demands that those responsible for the crimes described here be
punished. However. El Salvador has no system for the administration of justice which meets the minimum requirements of
objectivity and impartiality so that justice can be rendered

reliably.8 5

Taking this reality into account, the Commission decided not
to call for trials, nor for that matter to recommend amnesties.
The former made no sense until the full implementation of the
Peace Accords. The latter seemed worthwhile only, if at all, after
a national consensus that an amnesty would promote the goal of
reconciliation in El Salvador. Ultimately, the decision whether to
grant amnesty was one for the people of El Salvador to make after
an appropriate dialogue on the subject.
At the same time, it was clear that the Commission's findings
required some recommendations for immediate action. In the
Commission's view, those identified as responsible for serious acts
of violence had to be removed from the offices that had enabled
them to commit these acts. To this end, the Commission made a
series of recommendations. First, it called for the dismissal from
the armed forces of those active military officers who had
committed or covered up serious acts of violence. Second, the
Commission recommended the dismissal from their positions of
those civilian government officials and members of the judiciary
who committed or covered up serious acts of violence or failed to
investigate them. Third, the Commission declared that "[ulnder
no circumstances would it be advisable to allow persons who
committed acts of violence such as those which the Commission
has investigated to participate in the running of the State."8 6
Therefore, we recommended that appropriate legislation be
adopted to ensure that all individuals found by the Commission to
have been implicated in serious acts of violence-whether active
or retired military officers, civilian officials, FMLN members or
military commanders, judges, or civilians-should be disqualified
from holding any public office for a period of no less than ten
years. The Commission added that these persons should also be
"disqualified permanently from any activity related to public

security or national defence." 87

Finally, the Commission

85. Id. at 178.
86. Id. at 176.
87. Id. The Commission was aware, of course, that while the President of El
Salvador had the power to dismiss military officers and government offlcials, he
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recommended that all Supreme Court judges should resign from
office to permit the designation of new judges untainted by illegal
conduct. 8 8
The Commission made a series of recommendations designed
to promote national reconciliation. 9 It proposed, inter alla, the

construction of a national monument listing the names of all
victims of the Salvadoran conflict; a national holiday honoring
them; and the creation of a Forum for Truth and Reconciliation,
comprising representatives of all sectors of Salvadoran society, to
address the conclusions and recommendations of the Truth
Commission with a view to promoting their implementation. The
Commission also recommended the establishment of a fund to
compensate all victims of serious acts of violence. Calling on
foreign governments to assist El Salvador with these payments,
the Commission urged that at least one percent of all
international assistance received from abroad be earmarked for
such compensation.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
It will take years to fully assess the work and achievements of
the United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador. After all,
its success and failure can only be meaningfully judged in the
context of long-term developments in that country. At this point,
therefore, it is not really possible to do more than offer some very
tentative observations concerning its contribution to the
Salvadoran peace process.
A. Follow-Up and Compliance

A few days after the publication of the Report, the government
of President Cristiani and the national legislature controlled by
his party granted an across-the-board amnesty to all individuals
charged with serious acts of violence. This measure did not,
however, nullify the Commission's work or have a serious effect
on it. The amnesty merely prevented those identified by the

lacked that power as far as judges were concerned and, hence, that the
recommendations applicable to them and to civilians might require legislative or
even constitutional changes. In short, the Commission's recommendations were

binding on the Government and, for that matter, on the FMLN high command.
and it was up to them to implement the recommendations within the sphere of

their respective jurisdictions.
88. Id. at 177. Since these judges could not be removed from office until
their terms expired, the Commission merely called on them to resign.

89. Id. at 184-87.

538

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27:497

Commission as responsible for acts of violence from being tried in
Salvadoran courts and resulted in the release from prison of a few

others who had been convicted earlier in that country on similar
charges. Since the Commission did not recommend the trial of
those it named, the amnesty cannot be said to violate its
recommendations. However, while amnesties after a civil war
may be a legitimate way to put an end to the conflict, the manner
in which this amnesty was rushed through the Salvadoran
legislature-a legislature in which the FMLN was not
represented- with no time or opportunity for a full national
debate on the subject, was unseemly at the very least, indicative
of a lack of respect for democratic processes, and thus
incompatible with the spirit of the Peace Accords. It should be
emphasized, however, that the amnesty did not affect the
Commission's recommendations or override those calling for the
dismissal from their positions of individuals named in the Report.
Particularly noteworthy in this connection is the fact that all
military officers identified by the Commission were retired from
the service not long after the Report was issued.
Many of the legislative and administrative measures recommended by the Commission remain to be fully implemented,
although some progress has been made in transferring major
police power to the National Civil Police and in reforming the
justice system. Efforts to strengthen various national institutions
to better protect human rights are also on the way. However,
much still remains to be accomplished, and progress has been
much slower on all fronts than one might have hoped.90 On the
other hand, general elections were recently held in an atmosphere
of freedom never before witnessed in El Salvador. The FMLN, the
Christian Democrats, the government's ARENA Party, and a

number of other smaller political groups peacefully vied for votes.
And while there was some evidence of election fraud, it was not
substantial enough to have a major effect on the outcome or to
rupture the political peace of the country. In short, there Is
reason for hope. The elections and the climate in which they were
held suggest that few in El Salvador want a return to the past and
that a majority across the political spectrum Is eager to resolve Its
differences by political means rather than by violence.

90. For an analysis of this subject, see Report of the Independent Expert,
supra note 2. at 29.
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B. The Commission'sRole and Contribution
Of course, the Truth Commission cannot take credit for all
the progress that has been made in El Salvador, nor should it be
blamed for the slow pace with which the country has moved to
The real
transform itself into a modem democratic state.
contribution of the Truth Commission is at once more profound

and much less concrete. The release of the Report had a very
significant psychological impact on the people of El Salvador.
While the Peace Accords ended the armed conflict, the Report put
the country on the road to healing the emotional wounds that had
continued to divide it. The Report told the truth in a country that
was not accustomed to hearing it. To be restored to normalcy, El
Salvador needed to hear the truth from a source that had
legitimacy and credibility. The Commission met this standard
and performed its functions in a way that achieved this objective.
The war in El Salvador not only pitted the combatants in the
armed conflict against each other, but also totally polarized the
population. It became a country in which there was no room for
moderation or tolerance for peaceful political debate. Political
opponents were treated as enemies and acts of violence against
them rationalized as necessary or denied as propaganda. Political
allegiance rather than basic human decency determined one's
actions and reactions to the crimes that both sides committed. El
Salvador was a country in which many lived in fear, and where
few wished to know the truth. In this atmosphere the victims or
their next of kin often did not dare to denounce publicly what had
been done to them or even speak about it lest their claims expose
them to further abuse. People kept their suffering to themselves,
hoping for justice-a very human instinct-but not really
expecting it.
The efforts of the Truth Commission to get at the truth and
the release of its Report had a cathartic impact on the country.
Many of the people who came to the Commission to tell what
happened to them or to their relatives and friends had not done
so before. For some, ten years or more had gone by in silence and
pent-up anger. Finally, someone listened to them, and there
would be a record of what they had endured. They came by the
thousands, still afraid and not a little skeptical, and they talked,

many for the first time. One could not listen to them without
recognizing that the mere act of telling what had happened was a
healing emotional release, and that they were more interested in
recounting their story and being heard than in retribution. It is
as if they felt some shame that they had not dared to speak out
before and, now that they had done so, they could go home and
focus on the future less encumbered by the past.

540

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27:497

A particularly telling interview described by a Commission
staff member involved two mothers, one Salvadoran, the other
Scandinavian, who came to the Commission together to tell their
story. The son of one and the daughter of the other had met in
Europe and fallen in love. The couple traveled to El Salvador,
became involved in leftist activities and were murdered by rightist
death squads. The two mothers had not met until they decided to
tell their story together to the Truth Commission. They could
barely speak a common language, but they appeared in the

Commission's offices in San Salvador, sharing their grief and
honoring the memory of their children by telling the story of these
two young people.
The Report and its findings about many cases that had
encumbered the nation's conscience had a dramatic effect. The
findings confirmed what many suspected, some knew, and others
refused to believe.
Before the release of the Report, few
Salvadorans knew the whole story and many more could not
separate the truth from the lies and rumors that were rampant
even after the signing of the Peace Accords. The result was a
never-ending acrimonious debate and the exchange of
inflammatory charges and counter-charges by the former
combatants and their allies. The Report put an end to this
debate, and thus allowed the country to focus on the future
rather than on the cruel and divisive past. It removed the biggest
obstacle on the way to national reconciliation: the denial of a
terrible truth that divided the nation and haunted its consciousness.
How and why did the Commission succeed in bringing about
this result? Much of it had to do with the credibility the
Commission was able to establish for itself.
Here the
Commissioners were convinced from the outset that we had to
achieve two objectives. First, we had to come up with a fact-finding process that inspired confidence in the sense that the public
was convinced-it had to see-that the Commission really wanted
to know and tell the truth. Second, we had to do everything in
our power to ensure that the truth of our findings could not be
impugned.
If our Report were found to contain many
inaccuracies, no matter how insignificant, this would undermine

confidence in all of its findings. That would have been the case
too if the Commission were to do or say things that demonstrated
a bias in favor of one side or the other.
It would appear that the Commission met the credibility test.
We were criticized, of course, particularly by some who were
named in the Report. However, there were no serious allegations
of factual error. That so many people came forward with their
testimonies suggests that the Commissioners gradually gained
the confidence of the population and that after a while people no
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longer assumed the investigation to be rigged. A number of
factors helped the Commission to gain the trust of the Salvadoran
population, including: our "open door" policy of inviting testimony
from anyone having information, our nation wide publicity
campaigns urging the public to come forward, our young staff
members who radiated a genuine commitment to their task and
empathy for the victims, and finally, the public and private
pronouncements of the Commissioners.
Not naming names would not necessarily have affected our
credibility had the Commission's mandate expressly denied us
that power, for then the failure to name names could not have
been blamed on our lack of integrity. The situation would have
been different, however, if no individual perpetrators were
identified despite the fact that we had the power to do so and had
raised expectations during our investigation that names would be
made public. Here, confidence in the personal integrity of the
Commissioners would have been shaken because of a perception
that we were giving in to political pressure.
It was also important that the people named in the Report
were not only the "small fry." Some very "big fish" were identified,
proving what many in El Salvador thought impossible, namely,
that the veil of impunity had finally been pierced. True, there
were other big fish who escaped our net, among them the
financiers of death squads and some FMLN commanders who
were alleged to have committed serious acts of violence. But to
have named individuals when the evidence was not convincing
would have been terribly unjust and an abuse of our power. It
also carried with it the risk that our findings would be proven to

contain serious errors, thus affecting the credibility of the Report
as a whole. Here the best we could do was hope that the people of
El Salvador, after evaluating the Report as a whole, would have to
recognize that we did not act out of some improper motive.
C. PossibleLessonsfor Future Commissions

As noted earlier, El Salvador's population was deeply
polarized by the armed conflict and by life in a climate of distrust
and suspicion. In this environment, the Commission gained
immediate credibility from the decision of the Parties that the
Commissioners should be foreign nationals. As such, we could:
not be accused of having some domestic Salvadoran political
stake or motive in reaching a particular decision. No three
Salvadorans, however honorable and apolitical, could possibly,
have escaped such an accusation. The country was too small for
that, the conflict too bitter, and the domestic political culture too
immature. Moreover, many of the witnesses we interviewed were
willing to provide us with information they never would have
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divulged to a Salvadoran commission for fear that their identity
would not have remained confidential, or that at some point in
the future their testimony would be used to harm or put pressure
on them. El Salvador, because of its small size, is a country
where everybody knows everybody else and where secrets are
hard to keep. The Commissioners, being foreigners with no ties to
the country, were less likely than Salvadorans to have an
opportunity or reason to divulge the source of information
obtained by them in confidence. In countries not facing these
problems, a national or mixed commission, comprised of
nationals and foreigners, might serve the same purpose.
The Commission received very valuable help from the United
Nations and from the representatives of the governments that
served as "Friends of the Peace Process." The presence in El
Salvador of ONUSAL-the Spanish acronym for the United
Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador-served the Commission
as more than an important source of logistic support. For one
thing, it would have been practically impossible for the
Commission to establish itself and begin working in El Salvador
without any significant loss of time had ONUSAL not been there.
Moreover, the fact that ONUSAL's military, police, and civilian
personnel had offices and could be seen all over El Salvador also
had an important pacifying effect on the country. It kept the
combatants and their supporters apart, it diffused dangerous
situations, and gave both sides a feeling of relative security. By
the time the Commission arrived in El Salvador, ONUSAL had
succeeded in creating a political and social climate that greatly
facilitated the task of the Commission.
The absence of a
transition government in El Salvador made the presence of
ONUSAL critical to the Commission's ability to discharge its
mandate. Therefore, it appears to me that without a significant
international presence in a country, or a new government, a truth
commission will find it extremely difficult to discharge its
mandate.
The Four Friends' ambassadors to the United Nations and to
El Salvador provided the Commission with invaluable diplomatic
assistance and political advice. In El Salvador and in New York,
they often served as our intermediaries and counselors, as well as
our eyes and ears. Their special relation to the Parties to the
Peace Accords, their experience at the United Nations, and their
individual and collective knowledge of El Salvador's rapidly
changing political climate enabled us to avoid many mistakes that
might have adversely affected our work. In short, the role the
Four Friends performed was very important to the success of our
mission. International truth commissions will, in my opinion,
always need some diplomatic support or intermediaries to run
interference for them and to provide political advice. A "friends"
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system can be extremely helpful.
The fact that the three Commissioners were widely known
and respected in Latin America contributed to instilling
confidence in the integrity of the process both inside and outside
of El Salvador. In that regard, it was also most helpful that the
chairman of the Commission was the former President of one of
the most populous Latin American countries and that the other
two also had held important positions in the region. Our back-

grounds gave us easy access to government officials throughout
the Americas; enabled us to obtain the assistance of numerous
individuals, governmental and nongovernmental groups, and
institutions; and made it very difficult for the Parties to the Peace
Accords to deprecate our views or to discredit us. We were able to
use our status and personal connections to overcome a variety of
obstacles that were placed in our way, to anticipate problems, and
to diffuse potential crises-the dispute over naming names being
but one example-all of which could have impaired our
effectiveness. The more difficult the job a truth commission faces,
the more important it is, in my opinion, for at least one or more
members of such a body to be distinguished and internationally
respected personalities with political, military, diplomatic, or
judicial experience.
Another important factor that greatly facilitated the work of
the Truth Commission and contributed to its success was the
good personal rapport that developed among the Commissioners.
When I was first named to the Commission, some of my friends
warned me that I was there as its token human rights person and
that the two other members, both politicians, might force
questionable political compromises on me. These concerns
proved to be totally unfounded. There developed among us an
unusually strong trust in and respect for the personal integrity,
judgment, and professionalism of our colleagues and a bond of
friendship. All of these made for an easy and fruitful collaboration. As noted before, all of our decisions were made by
common agreement. We never put any issue to a vote, and
despite our different backgrounds, we usually approached an
issue in much the same way. Although it is never easy to predict
the likely personal interaction between individuals, no truth

commission should be established without serious thought being
given to the ability of potential members to work together
amicably and in the interest of a common objective.
The three Commissioners were shocked to find that the
terror, brutality, and suffering inflicted on the people of El
Salvador between 1980 and 1991 was much worse and more
pervasive than we had imagined. What is more, those responsible
for these acts of violence were protected by a fail-safe system of
impunity that gradually corrupted all institutions of the State,
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leaving it defenseless against the onslaught of extremists from the
left and the right who, under the banner of conflicting ideologies,
justified conduct and policies that can never be Justified. It may
well be that the unexpected horrors we uncovered brought the
Commissioners closer together and strengthened our resolve to do
the best and most honest job we possibly could.
My experience on the Truth Commission has convinced me
that. the most important function such a body can perform is to
teli the truth. That may sound obvious and trite, but it needs to
be said because it has tended to get lost in the discussion about
national reconciliation. The assumption that bringing out the
truth will rub salt into the nation's wounds and make national
reconciliation more difficult to achieve has a certain superficial
logic to it, but it is wrong in my opinion. A nation has to confront
its past by acknowledging the wrongs that have been committed
in its name before It can successfully embark on the arduous task
of cementing the trust between former adversaries and their
respective sympathizers, which is a prerequisite for national
reconciliation. One cannot hope to achieve this objective by
sweeping the truth under the rug of national consciousness, by
telling the victims or their next of kin that nothing happened, or
by asking them not to tell their particular story. The wounds
begin to heal with the telling of the story and the national
acknowledgment of its authenticity.
How that story is told is less important than that it be told
truthfully. Hence, whether the names of the perpetrators are
revealed, whether trials are held, sanctions imposed, compensation awarded, or amnesties granted, 91 these are all considerations
that may well depend upon the nature of the conflict, the national
character of the country, the political realities, and compromises
that produced the end of the conflict. But if the basic truth about
the past is suppressed, it will prove very difficult to achieve
national reconciliation. The wounds left behind by the past will
continue to fester and endanger the peace. The truth may be
strong medicine, but there is, in my opinion, no other way if the
goal is to bring together a people divided by a civil war or a
murderous regime.

91. On this subject generally, see Josd Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical
Imperatives and Political Constraints:The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting
Past Human Rights Violations. 43 HASTiNGS L.J. 425 (1992); Diane F. Orentlicher,
Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a PriorRegime,
100 YALE L. REV. 2537 (1991); Naomi Roht-Arriaz, State Responsibility to
Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in InternationalLaw, 78
CAL. L. REv. 451 (1990).

